Approximate Equilibrium and Incentivizing Social Coordination by Anshelevich, Elliot & Sekar, Shreyas
Approximate Equilibrium and Incentivizing
Social Coordination
Elliot Anshelevich Shreyas Sekar
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180
eanshel@cs.rpi.edu, sekars@rpi.edu.
October 1, 2018
Abstract
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form so-
cially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coor-
dination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents
have different intrinsic preferences but they stand to gain if others choose
the same strategy as them. For non-trivial versions of our game, stable
solutions like Nash Equilibrium may not exist, or may be socially ineffi-
cient even when they do exist. This motivates us to focus on designing
efficient algorithms to compute (almost) stable solutions like Approximate
Equilibrium that can be realized if agents are provided some additional
incentives. Our results apply in many settings like adoption of new prod-
ucts, project selection, and group formation, where a central authority can
direct agents towards a strategy but agents may defect if they have better
alternatives. We show that for any given instance, we can either compute
a high quality approximate equilibrium or a near-optimal solution that
can be stabilized by providing small payments to some players. We then
generalize our model to encompass situations where player relationships
may exhibit complementarities and present an algorithm to compute an
Approximate Equilibrium whose stability factor is linear in the degree of
complementarity. Our results imply that a little influence is necessary in
order to ensure that selfish players coordinate and form socially efficient
solutions.
1 Introduction
Historically, the term coordination game has been applied to social interactions
with positive network externalities. Typically, they are used to represent sce-
narios like the Battle of the Sexes wherein self-interested agents benefit if and
only if they choose the same strategy. Such a model, however, does not fully
capture real-life situations like the adoption of technologies or opinions and the
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selection of activities where agents may eschew coordination if their personal
preference for an alternative is very strong. For instance, a company may not
adhere to common standards if the benefit from using their own proprietary
technology far outweighs the gains from coordinating. Bearing this in mind, we
consider the following broader interpretation of coordination games as ‘a class of
games where agents’ utilities increase when more people choose the same strat-
egy as them’. Notice that this does not preclude agents from having intrinsic
preferences for strategies.
Many social and economic interactions fall within our framework (see [21,25]
for specific applications of coordination games and different types of interac-
tions) and it is not surprising that the kind of games we are interested in have
appeared in various guises throughout literature. Researchers have studied sim-
ilar kinds of games in several settings including opinion formation [12], infor-
mation sharing [26], coalition formation [19] and party affiliation [7,24], largely
focusing on the existence and quality of stable solutions.
Given the significance of social coordination games, a natural question that
arises is: Do instances of such games result in stable outcomes that are com-
parable to the social optimum, the solution maximizing social welfare. The
somewhat negative answer to this question that we provide serves as the start-
ing point for our work as it highlights the need for incentivizing agents to form
solutions that are beneficial for society. We attempt to answer the above ques-
tion by articulating two fundamental drawbacks of coordination games, which
naturally lead to the issue of influencing players to form “good” solutions.
1. Coordination Failures. Coordination games suffer from Coordination
Failures [15] that result in agents becoming trapped in inefficient equi-
libria despite the existence of high-welfare equilibria. These situations
arise when agents settle for less risky alternatives if they anticipate that
other agents may not coordinate with them on what are potentially “high-
risk, high-reward” solutions. As an example, consider N independent but
complementary firms, each with a distinct preferred location, deciding
on where to locate. Suppose that each company receives unit utility for
choosing their favorite location and one more unit for every additional firm
that choose to locate in the same area. Clearly an optimum and stable
solution is one where all companies choose the same location. However,
the outcome where each chooses their preferred location is also stable as
no company could unilaterally deviate and profit. There is a large body
of theoretical and experimental evidence (see [27] for a survey) that sup-
ports the hypothesis that agents may coordinate on inefficient outcomes
even when better alternatives exist.
2. Non-existence of Equilibrium. In instances where player relationships
are asymmetric (they receive different gains from coordinating), a Pure
Nash Equilibrium1 may not even exist. The following example illustrates
one such simple instance with three players and three strategies.
1We shall henceforth refer to Pure Nash Equilibrium as just Nash Equilibrium
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Example There are 3 players i1, i2, i3. Player ij receives a utility of
√
2
if she chooses strategy j and unit utility from strategy j + 1 (addition
here is modulo 3). Also, player ij receives coordination gains of 1 when
player ij+1 chooses the same strategy as her. Note that relationships
are asymmetric so player ij+1 receives no benefit for choosing the same
strategy as player ij .
It is not hard to verify that no Nash equilibrium exists for this instance.
The reader is asked to refer to the proof of Proposition 3.1 for details.
It is evident that even in fairly simple coordination games, it may be necessary
to guide agents to form desirable solutions. From a central point of view, a
high social welfare is the most important requirement, but at the same time it
is necessary that selfish agents do not deviate from these centrally promoted
solutions. A key algorithmic challenge is therefore, computing stable outcomes
with good social welfare that can be formed by providing each agent a small
incentive. It is towards this end that we identify approximate equilibria as our
primary solution concept.
Approximate Equilibrium and Forming Stable Solutions. An α-
Approximate Equilibrium is an outcome in which no player can improve their
utility by a factor more than α by unilaterally deviating. Observe from the
definition that if each player is provided additional benefits equaling a fraction
(α−1) times their original utility, then no player would wish to deviate and the
Approximate Equilibrium becomes a Nash Equilibrium. Alternatively, approx-
imate stability corresponds to the addition of a switching cost that captures
the inertia players may have in changing strategies unless the added benefit is
large enough. In addition to being a simple generalization of Nash Equilibrium,
approximate equilibria are also easily implementable or enforceable in natural
settings as opposed to non-deterministic generalizations like Mixed Nash Equi-
libria.
We focus on computing approximate equilibria with high social welfare es-
tablishing that although coordination games may not admit Nash Equilibrium,
the addition of a relatively small amount of inertia to the game causes stable
solutions with high social welfare to exist. We also consider group deviations
via approximate strong equilibrium [18], computing solutions which are resilient
to deviations by sets of players. A solution s is an α-Approximate Strong Equi-
librium if in any deviation by a set of players from s, at least one of the players’
utilities cannot improve by a factor more than α as compared to her original
utility. We may also refer to α as the stability factor for all approximately stable
solutions.
Formalizing our Model of Coordination Games
We begin by considering a non-transferable utility game with N players and
m distinct strategies. We assume that players have access to all strategies,
therefore in any outcome of the game, a player’s strategy si ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Generalizing our examples from the previous section, we not only permit pre-
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ferred strategies, but allow each player to have asymmetric preferences over the
strategy set. Formally, player i derives a utility of wki if she chooses strategy
1 ≤ k ≤ m.
With regards to the coordination aspect, we now propose a framework where
the benefits of coordination between two players do not depend on externalities.
Specifically, suppose that w(i, j)2 is the total coordination benefit when players
i and j choose the same strategy and that this benefit is divided among the
two players. Formally, player i derives a utility of γijw(i, j) for coordinating
with j and player j receives γjiw(i, j). For a given instance of our game, the
values (γij , γji)∀(i, j) are fixed and add up to one. So given a strategy vector
s = (s1, · · · , sn), the utility of a player i has two components,
ui(s) = w
si
i +
∑
sj=si
γijw(i, j).
We parameterize any instance on a factor γ that captures the maximum asym-
metry that exists in relationships. Formally γ = max
γij
γji
over all pairs (i, j). We
term this parameter, the Maximum Relationship Imbalance (MRI). Since we are
concerned with the quality of stable solutions, we define a social welfare func-
tion u(s) to be the sum of player utilities. Mathematically, u(s) =
∑
i ui(s) =∑
i w
si
i +
∑
si=sj
w(i, j). We define the optimum to be the solution maximizing
social welfare and compare the quality of our solutions to the optimum welfare
OPT .
1.1 Our Contributions.
In this work, we consider the following well-motivated question: can we imple-
ment solutions with high social welfare by providing each player some incentive
to not deviate? Our main results answer this question in the affirmative, and
more importantly we show that this is possible for every instance using one of
our two incentivizing schemes. First, we present an algorithm based on greedy
dynamics to compute a good quality, almost-stable solution.
• (Theorem 4.5) There is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an α-
Approximate Equilibrium (α ∈ [1.618, 2]) with a social welfare that is
comparable to the optimum.
An approximate equilibrium corresponds to an easily realizable solution in the
presence of either incentives, switching costs or players with inertia. Our second
main result considers a complementary notion of stability: the minimum total
payment to be provided to players so that they do not deviate from a desired
high quality solution. For any given instance, if the algorithm of Theorem 4.5
returns an α-Approximate Equilibrium with social welfare ρα · OPT , then we
show
• (Theorem 5.1) The optimum solution can be stabilized with a total pay-
ment of ραα−1OPT .
2We take w(i, j) and w(j, i) to refer to the same entity
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Informally, this result tells us that if we can provide certain players supple-
mentary utility, then with a finite budget we can stabilize the optimum solution.
Given any instance, we first run the algorithm of Theorem 4.5 to compute an
α-Approximate Equilibrium with social welfare ρα· OPT. If ρα is large, then we
have an almost-stable solution with high social welfare; else, if ρα is small, then
with a budget of ≈ ρα·OPT, we can force even the optimum solution to be sta-
ble. Together our two theorems imply something much stronger: we can always
either compute almost-stable solutions with high welfare, or directly stabilize
a good quality solution with small payments.
In the process, we show some additional computability results for equilibria
in our game.
• For m = 2, we can compute a Nash Equilibrium and Strong Equilibrium
in polynomial time.
• For m = 3, we can compute a 1.414-Approximate Equilibrium and this
factor is tight. i.e., for α < 1.414, α-Approximate Equilibrium may not
exist.
• For m ≥ 3, a 1.618-Approximate Equilibrium and a 2-Approximate Strong
Equilibrium always exist and we give algorithms to compute both.
• We obtain tight lower bounds for the social welfare of the solution com-
puted by the algorithm of Theorem 4.5 in terms of γ (Maximum Rela-
tionship Imbalance). When γ is not too large, we show that this social
welfare is comparable to the optimum. For instance, if relationships are
not too asymmetric and γ = 2, we can compute a 2-Approximate Equi-
librium whose social welfare is always at least forty percent of OPT and a
1.618-Approximate Equilibrium whose social welfare is one-third of OPT.
If γ < 2, then we can do much better. Table 1 captures the social welfare
of the solution returned by our algorithm for different values of m and γ.
Existence. In general, Nash Equilibrium need not exist when m ≥ 3. How-
ever, we identify sufficient conditions that encapsulate a broad class of Social
Coordination Games (even when reward sharing is asymmetric) that guarantee
the existence of a Nash Equilibrium. We do this by exhibiting a novel ordinal
potential function for games where the benefits of coordination among players
are closely correlated across relationships. This allows the mechanism designer
to identify or create settings where repeated best-response by players always
converges to a stable solution. We also show that Strong Equilibrium need not
exist when m ≥ 3 even under simplifying assumptions like γij = 1 ∀(i, j).
1.2 Related Work.
Our model of social coordination is closely linked to two well known classes of
games: non-transferable utility coalition formation and party affiliation. We
begin by surveying the substantial literature in both these fields and examine
the ties between our model and the games in these frameworks.
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α = 2 α = 1.618
γ m = 4 m→∞ m = 4 m→∞
1 0.57OPT 0.5OPT 0.424OPT 0.35OPT
2 0.47 0.4 0.37 0.29
10 0.25 0.15 0.18 0.12
Table 1: Performance of our algorithm: The social welfare of our computed
solution as a fraction of the optimum welfare for different values of m (Number
of strategies) and γ (Maximum Relationship Imbalance).
Hedonic games model players forming coalitions such that a player’s utility
depends only on the members of her own coalition. Our model can be embedded
in this setting by considering a fixed number of non-anonymous coalitions and
a set of players who are anchored, i.e., constrained to join only one particular
group. Much of the work in hedonic coalition formation has focused on iden-
tifying conditions for the existence of stable solutions [8, 10]. It is known, for
instance, that if relationships are symmetric then the existence of Nash Equilib-
rium can be guaranteed by means of a potential function. Augustine et al. [3]
consider a model similar to ours with the coordination benefits being submod-
ular and characterize settings where Nash Equilibrium always exist. Although
our games do not admit Nash Equilibrium, our results imply the existence of a
stability concept that is slightly weaker than Nash stability for a large class of
hedonic games with asymmetry.
Another line of work has focused on quantifying the inefficiency of stable
solutions [11] and on the computation of stable solutions [4, 16, 20]. Although
there have been a number of positive algorithmic results, the focus on approx-
imating both stability and optimality has been limited. We also remark here
that many of the defection models considered in the hedonic games literature
are relevant for settings with an unbounded number of anonymous coalitions
and may not be suitable for our class of games. With regards to influencing,
the recent work on stabilizing desired coalitions via supplementary payments
(the Cost of Stability) [5] is similar to our direct payments technique, albeit in
a transferable utility setting.
Party affiliation games are a generalization of pure coordination games where
players wish to coordinate with friends and anti-coordinate with enemies. On
the other hand, in our model the friction is provided by the interplay between
a player’s individual preference and coordination. Party affiliation games with
only two strategies and symmetric relationships have received considerable at-
tention as Nash Equilibrium always exists in these settings although computing
it is PLS-Complete [13]. As a positive algorithmic result, Bhalgat et al. ( [9])
gave a polynomial time algorithm to compute a (3 + )-Approximate Equilib-
rium for such games. Most similar to our work in terms of motivation is the
paper by Balcan et al. ( [7]) who consider a model where only a limited number
of players follow the centrally advertised strategy. Even though we look at only
one aspect of party affiliation, our model is quite general as we do not impose
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any restriction on the number of strategies or player relationships.
Other models of coordination in strategic settings. There has been a
renewed interest in studying coordination games in networks from a theoretical
perspective with an emphasis on identifying the kind of equilibrium outcomes
that emerge. In particular, work has focused on characterizing the effect of
several parameters on the equilibrium outcome including the cost of forming
links [22, 25], network structure [14], level of interaction [32] and incomplete
information [21]. The literature on coordination games is too vast and the
reader is asked to refer to the paper by [21] for a more detailed survey.
2 Preliminaries and Warm-up Results
In this section, we address some fundamental questions regarding stability and
optimality in our Social Coordination Game (SCG) in order to gain a better
understanding of our model. We then move on to the most simple version of our
game where players only have two different strategies to choose from. For this
special case, we present an algorithm that always returns a Nash Equilibrium
whose social welfare is half of the optimum. We begin by casting our game
in graph theoretic framework to compare our problem to existing optimization
problems.
Social Coordination as a Network Game. We can view our model
as a game played on a complete graph G = (V,E) where the nodes include
the players and m additional anchored nodes (which are constrained to choose
only one strategy). Each directed edge (i, j) has a weight γijw(i, j), the utility
player i derives from coordinating with j. Recall that player j derives a utility
of γjiw(i, j) from coordinating with player i and a utility of w
k
j for choosing
strategy 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
We now define some additional notation to understand the social welfare
of solutions better. We divide the social welfare of any strategy vector s into
two components. u(s) = A(s) + P (s), where A(s) refers to the utility players
receive due to their intrinsic preference for the chosen strategy and P (s), the
contribution of players’ relationships to social welfare, both under s. Mathe-
matically A(s) =
∑
i w
si
i and P (s) =
∑
si=sj
w(i, j). We denote by best(i), the
maximum utility that player i derives from any one strategy and use AT to
express
∑
i best(i). Similarly, we use PT to refer to
∑
(i,j) w(i, j), the maximum
possible contribution of players’ relationships to social welfare. Finally, we can
upper bound OPT by AT + PT .
It is not hard to see that the problem of maximizing social welfare is equiva-
lent to the problem of dividing the graph into m clusters to maximize the weight
inside the clusters. This in turn is equivalent to the problem of minimizing the
weight of the edges going across different clusters, which is the popular Multiway
Cut problem. We infer therefore, that the problem of maximizing social welfare
in any given instance of the Social Coordination Game is NP-Hard.
Proposition 2.1. For m > 2, computing the optimum solution for an instance
of the Social Coordination Game is NP-Hard even for a fixed value of γ.
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The optimization version of our problem was considered for undirected graphs
in [28] as the Multiway Uncut problem. They exhibited a 0.8535 approximation
algorithm for the same using an LP-rounding based approach. We extend their
results to the directed version via a simple reduction.
Proposition 2.2. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a so-
lution of the SCG such that its social welfare is at least a fraction 0.8535 of
OPT .
Proof. Given an instance of the SCG, we create an undirected graph with weight
w(i, j) on edge (i, j) and run the algorithm of Langberg et al.
Social Coordination Games with Two strategies
The simplest form of Social Coordination is one where players get to choose
between two distinct strategies, which has received considerable attention in
literature. For this special case, we are able to guarantee the existence of a
Nash Equilibrium by constructing one for any given instance. Our actual result
is much stronger, we give a sequence of best-response moves from any given
starting state that always results in a Nash Equilibrium. By Proposition 3.3
(shown in the next section), we are guaranteed that this solution is at least half
as good as OPT in terms of social welfare.
Algorithm 1 Computing Nash Equilibrium when m = 2
1: Allow players to deviate from strategy 1 to 2 if it is their best response until
no player wants to deviate from strategy 1.
2: Repeat this for the other strategy until no player can improve her utility by
deviating from strategy 2.
Proposition 2.3. The above algorithm returns a Nash Equilibrium from any
given starting state s0 such that its social welfare is at least half of OPT .
Proof. At the end of Step 1, no player would want to deviate from strategy 1 to
2 by definition. These players would not want to deviate after step 2 either as
their utility only increases. By definition, players cannot improve their utility
by deviating from strategy 2 and thereby we have a Nash Equilibrium.
A similar algorithm was used in [12] to compute Nash equilibria in a cost
minimization game with two preferences.
3 Existence and Quality of Stable Solutions
In the previous section, we showed that if every player has exactly two strategies
to choose from, we can always compute an equilibrium in polynomial time.
Unfortunately, we are not so lucky even if players have one additional strategy
to choose from as Nash Equilibrium may not exist. However, in this section,
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we show sufficient conditions to guarantee the existence of equilibrium when
m ≥ 3. In the context of our central theme of incentivizing coordination, this
is useful in settings where the central designer may not be able to provide any
direct incentives but can exert some control over the parameters of the game so
that natural game play (best-response dynamics) results in stable solutions.
Although similar games like Party affiliation and Discrete opinion formation
also admit potential functions [9, 12], our result does not follow from theirs as
our potential function is not an exact potential function. Further, our conditions
also capture scenarios where the benefits of coordination are not equally shared.
First, we formalize the example given in the introduction regarding the non-
existence of equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1. There exist instances of the Social Coordination Game with
three strategies where Nash Equilibria do not exist.
i1 i2
i3
x1 x2
x3
r
rr
√
2r √ 2r
√ 2
r
r
r
r
Figure 1: Instance of the SCG with 3 strategies (represented by shaded anchor
nodes) and three players (i1, i2, i3). Player ij receives a utility of
√
2r if she
chooses strategy xj and r utility from strategy xj+1. Also, player ij receives
coordination gains of r when player ij+1 chooses the same strategy as her.
Proof. In any equilibrium, each player receives a utility of at least
√
2r or else
they could deviate to their favorite strategy. It is not hard to see that in any
strategy other than the one where all players are separated, at least one player’s
utility is strictly less than
√
2r and hence she would deviate. Therefore, in every
strategy at least one player can deviate and improve her utility by a factor of√
2.
Although existence cannot be guaranteed for the general case, the following
natural assumption captures a broad class of SCGs for which Nash Equilibrium
always exists.
(Correlated Coordination Condition) A given instance of the SCG is
said to satisfy this condition if ∃ a vector γ = (γ1, · · · , γN ) such that ∀(i, j)
with w(i, j) > 0, we have γij =
γi
γi+γj
and γji =
γj
γi+γj
.
Informally, each player has an intrinsic weight or an influence factor γi.
When two players (say i and j) coordinate, the benefit that any one player
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derives depends on her relative weight with respect to the other player. For
any two players i and j, if γi ≥ γj , then player i receives a greater benefit due
to coordinating with player j. Notice that this definition does not impose any
restriction on how asymmetric relationships can be. We now claim that games
which obey this condition not only have Nash Equilibrium but in fact admit an
ordinal (inexact) potential function [31] that ensures that best-response always
converges to an equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2. Social Coordination Games which obey the Correlated Coor-
dination (CC) Condition admit a potential function. Therefore, best-response
dynamics always converge to a Nash Equilibrium in such games.
Proof. Given a social coordination game with weights w(i, j),∀(i, j) and γ =
(γ1, · · · , γN ), that obeys the CC condition, we claim that the following is an
inexact potential function for this game.
Φ(s) =
∑
i
wsii
γi
+
∑
si=sj
w(i, j)
γi + γj
.
To prove this, we need to show that whenever a player makes an improving
move, the potential function increases and vice-versa. Consider a strategy vector
s and a player i whose utility increases, when she deviates from si to s
′
i. The
change in her utility is ui(s
′
i, s−i)−ui(si, s−i) = (ws
′
i
i +
∑
sj=s′i
γijw(i, j))−(wsii +∑
sj=si
γijw(i, j)), which is positive. As our games obey the CC condition, we
can substitute γij with
γi
γi+γj
and obtain,
w
s′i
i +
∑
sj=s′i
γi
w(i, j))
γi + γj
− wsii −
∑
sj=si
γi
w(i, j)
γi + γj
> 0.
This implies that,
γi(
w
s′i
i
γi
+
∑
sj=s′i
w(i, j)
γi + γj
− w
si
i
γi
−
∑
sj=si
w(i, j)
γi + γj
) > 0.
Since γi is always positive, we conclude that the term inside the parenthesis
must be positive as well. Therefore, the potential function strictly increases
when players make a better-response move. The other direction is similar, if
(
w
s′i
i
γi
+
∑
sj=s′i
w(i,j)
γi+γj
− w
si
i
γi
−∑sj=si w(i,j)γi+γj ) > 0, then we multiply both sides by
γi yielding the change in player i’s utility on the left hand side. This indicates
that any deviation by a player which increases the potential function must be
a strictly improving move. We conclude that these games admit a potential
function. Therefore, best-response dynamics must always converge to a Nash
Equilibrium.
Among other scenarios of interest, the CC conditions also captures games
where player relationships are symmetric but players may derive any arbitrary
utility from choosing a strategy(γi = γj ∀(i, j)). Therefore, if the benefits of a
relationship are split equally among the players, stable solutions always exist.
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Quality of Stable Solutions
Although Nash Equilibrium exists for special cases, it is not clear whether these
stable solutions would be centrally desirable in terms of social welfare. We
now formalize the notion of “Coordination Failures” that we mentioned earlier
and show that in general Coordination Games, both the best and worst Nash
Equilibrium can be a factor m away from the social optimum. In other words,
even when Nash Equilibrium exists, all stable solutions may have a social welfare
that is only a small fraction of OPT . This reinforces the need for some external
influence in order to ensure solutions that are closer to OPT in terms of social
welfare.
Proposition 3.3. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) for Social Coordination Games
over all instances is at most m.
The Price of Anarchy is the ratio of the social welfare of the optimum to
that of the worst Nash Equilibrium (equilibrium with the lowest social welfare
for a given instance) over all instances.
(Proof Sketch) We use a refinement of the popular smoothness technique [33]
known as semi-smoothness (see [2, 30] for more details) for proving the above
bound. The full proof is present in the appendix. We show that our Social
Coordination Game is ( 1m , 0)-semi-smooth for all instances. This immediately
gives us an upper bound of m for the Price of Anarchy. 
Note that by the generality of the smoothness technique, we are guaran-
teed that the Price of Anarchy is m for solution concepts that are much more
general than Nash Equilibrium including Mixed Nash Equilibrium and Coarse
Correlated Equilibrium. We now show that the above factor is tight by giving
a matching lower bound for the best Nash Equilibrium.
Proposition 3.4. The Price of Stability (PoS) for the SCG is at least m and
this is tight.
The Price of Stability for a given game is the maximum ratio of the social
welfare of the optimum and the best Nash Equilibrium over all instances.
Proof. (Example) Consider an instance withm strategies andm players, i1 · · · im.
Player i1 derives a utility r from strategy i and an additional utility of r for
every other player who chooses the same strategy as her. Players ij (j > 1)
receive a utility of 2 from choosing strategy j and an additional utility  if
player i1 chooses the same strategy. In the social optimum, all players choose
strategy 1, and we have u(OPT ) = mr + (m− 1). This instance has m differ-
ent Nash Equilibria based on which strategy player i1 chooses and every Nash
Equilibrium has a social welfare of r+ 2(m−1) . In the limiting case as → 0,
the ratio between the social welfares approaches m.
This implies that in instances where Nash Equilibrium exist, all stable so-
lutions can have a social welfare that is much worse than the optimum (if m is
large). Propositions 3.3, 3.4 also tell us that if we are able to limit the number of
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choices available to self-interested agents, then all stable solutions exhibit high
social welfare.
Quality of Stable Solutions for the Symmetric Coordination Game
We return to the special case when player relationships are symmetric (rewards
are split-up equally), which is of considerable interest as it occurs in several
scenarios. Notice that this case can be expressed as a SCG with γij = 1 ∀(i, j)
and therefore, every player receives a utility of w(i,j)2 from each relationship.
We show that symmetry improves the situation by giving a tight upper bound
of (2 − 1m ) on the Price of Stability. Unfortunately, this best equilibrium may
not be computable. In the next section, we present an algorithm to compute an
approximate equilibrium that is almost as good as the best Nash Equilibrium.
First observe that the following is an exact potential function for the SCG with
symmetric relationships.
Φ(s) =
∑
i
wsii +
1
2
∑
si=sj
w(i, j).
Proposition 3.5. The price of stability is at most (2− 1m ) in social coordination
games with symmetric relationships, i.e. γ = 1. Further, this bound is tight.
(Proof Sketch) The complete proof can be found in the Appendix. We prove
the first part of the proposition by proving a much stronger statement on best-
response dynamics: that the loss in social welfare from certain ‘good starting
states’ after any best-response sequence is upper bounded by the factor 2− 1m .
Then all we need to show is that OPT belongs to these good states, by proving
that A(OPT ) ≥ ATm . We also show a tight example where the PoS is exactly
(2− 1m ), which completes the proof. 
The proposition also implies that in the special case with two strategies,
the polynomial-time best-response sequence described previously with OPT as
a starting state (can be computed using any algorithm for Min-Cut) leads to a
Nash equilibrium whose social welfare is at least two-thirds of OPT.
Corollary 3.6. Algorithm 1 for two strategy SCGs with symmetric relation-
ships returns a Nash Equilibrium that is at least two-thirds of the optimum when
OPT is used as the starting state.
4 Approximate Equilibrium
We now come to our main results. In the previous sections, we showed that
Nash Equilibrium may not exist for Social Coordination Games and even when
it does, its quality may not be comparable to the optimum. This motivates us
to relax our notion of stability and consider approximately stable solutions in
order to obtain better guarantees on the social welfare. Our first main result
in this section is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a 1.414-Approximate
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Equilibrium for SCGs with three strategies. When m > 3, we give an easily
implementable algorithm to compute an α-Approximate Equilibrium for α ∈
[φ, 2] (φ ≈ 1.618). As we showed that α-Approximate Equilibria for α < 1.414
do not exist for general SCGs, our stability results are nearly tight (up to a
factor of ≈ 1.14). Recall that in an α-Approximate Equilibrium, no player can
deviate from one strategy to another and increase her utility by more than α
times her previous utility.
Three Strategies: For m = 3, recall that in the example of Figure 3, in
every state there is at least one node that can deviate and improve its utility
by a factor of
√
2. We show now that this bound of
√
2 is tight by exhibit-
ing an algorithm for three groups that always returns a
√
2-Approximate Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1. The following algorithm returns a
√
2-Approximate Equilib-
rium for all instances with three strategies and no algorithm can give a better
approximation factor over all instances as this ratio of 1.414 is tight.
1. Run Algorithm 1 for m = 2 (for say strategies 1 and 2) and all players
so that no player wants to deviate from one of those two strategies to the
other.
2. While there exists a player, who can deviate from either strategy 1 or
strategy 2 and improve her utility by a factor
√
2 or more, allow her to
deviate to strategy 3. Once that player deviates, run the algorithm for
m = 2 (for strategies 1 and 2) so that players choosing these two strategies
are stable with respect to each other.
3. Repeat step 2 until no player can to deviate to 3 and increase her utility
by a factor
√
2.
In other words, at every stage of the algorithm, players in strategies 1 and 2
are stable with respect to each other. Players deviate to 3 only when it is their
best-response and it improves their utility by the given factor. The algorithm
terminates in polynomial-time as in each round the size of group 3 increases by
one. We prove that its stability factor is
√
2 in the appendix.
Moving on to the general case, we give an algorithm to compute a α-
Approximate Equilibrium and characterize the trade-off between stability and
optimality by showing how the social welfare increases when we decrease the
stability factor from α = 2 to α = φ. Figure 2(a) illustrates this near-linear
trade-off between social welfare and α. As mentioned, our bounds for social wel-
fare depend on γ, the Maximum Relationship Imbalance (MRI), that measures
the maximum asymmetry over all relationships. We explicitly use this factor γ
in our welfare as often real-life relationships are bounded in their asymmetry; if
one player receives large gains from coordinating with another, then the second
player derives at least some fraction of that benefit. Recall that γ = 1 denotes
the case with symmetric relationships, as γ increases, reward sharing becomes
more and more asymmetric.
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We begin by presenting a simple algorithm called one-shot α-BR, which
allows each player to play her best-response at most once as long as the im-
provement in utility is by a multiplicative factor α ≥ 1. This natural algorithm
has desirable properties in terms of both stability and welfare and acts as a
subroutine for many of our results in this section and the next. First, we show
the following lemma.
Algorithm 2 One-shot α-BR
Require: A starting strategy k0.
1: Set all players’ initial strategy to be k0.
2: While there exists a player whose current strategy is k0, who can improve
her utility by at least a factor α by deviating to another strategy, allow her
to perform best-response.
3: Return the final solution s.
Lemma 4.2. The One-shot α-BR algorithm returns a
(
max
(
α, 1α + 1
))
-approximate
equilibrium, for any starting strategy k0.
That is, for α ∈ [φ, 2], the One-Shot α-BR algorithm returns an α-Approximate
Equilibrium.
Proof. We introduce some notation here in order to analyze our one-shot α-BR
algorithm. First, assume that the algorithm proceeds in steps, such that at each
time step only one player deviates from k0. Clearly, the algorithm terminates
after at most N time steps. Let Xtk denote the set of players whose strategy is
k at time step t and st−i, the strategy vectors of all players other than i at that
time. Let Xk(s) refer to the players choosing strategy k in the final solution.
Our first observation is that the number of players choosing a particular strategy
other than k0 cannot decrease with time.
Now, consider any player i such that i deviated to some strategy k = si at
time t. Then, we have
ui(si, s
t
−i) ≥ ui(k′, st−i) ∀k′ 6= si
ui(si, s
t
−i) ≥ αui(k0, st−i)
(1)
Since i performs her best-response, she derives more utility from her strategy
than she would by deviating to any other strategy. Each player who deviates
improves her utility by a factor α by definition, which gives us the second
inequality above. Now suppose that i’s best-response under s is to move to some
strategy k′. Observe thatXk′(s) ⊆ Xtk′∪Xtk0 as the new players choosing k′ after
time t can only come from the k0. The utility that i gets from this best-response
strategy k′ can be upper bounded as ui(k′, s−i) ≤ ui(k′, st−i) + ui(k0, st−i) ≤
ui(si, s
t
−i) +
ui(si,s
t
−i)
α ≤ (1 + 1α )ui(s). The last two inequalities come from
invariant 1 and the fact that Xtk ⊆ Xk(s) respectively, giving us the stability
factor for players who deviated from k0.
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By definition, the algorithm terminates when no player whose strategy is
k0 can deviate and improve her utility by a factor α. Therefore, for any player
i ∈ Xk0(s) and other strategy k′ 6= k0, we have αui(s) ≥ ui(k′, s−i). This means
that any arbitrary player in N can perform her best-response and improve her
utility by a factor no greater than max(α, 1α+1), which completes the proof.
The following lemmas give us an idea about the social welfare of the solution
returned by the One-Shot α-BR algorithm. In particular, we see that players
get at least as much utility as they would by choosing their favorite strategy
(in the absence of coordination). Further, the final utility is quite close to the
utility of the starting state where all players choose the same strategy k0. Recall
that AT is the total utility received by players from their preferred strategy, and
A(s) and P (s) are the utilities due to intrinsic preference and coordination in
any given strategy s.
Lemma 4.3. The 1-shot α-BR algorithm, beginning with any starting strategy
k0, returns a solution whose social welfare is at least
AT
α
Lemma 4.4. The one-shot α-BR algorithm with s0 as the starting state (where
all players choose a strategy k0), results in a social welfare of at least A(s0) +
α
γ+1P (s0), where γ is the Maximum Relationship imbalance.
(Proof Sketch) The full proofs can be found in the appendix. Notice that the
algorithm allows each player to deviate exactly once, so each player gets as much
as she would (discounted by α) by choosing her preferred strategy. Summing
up over all players gives us Lemma 4.3. For the second lemma, observe that if a
player i deviates, and the utility of other players drops by some amount y, then
player i’s original utility was at least 1γ y. Since she performs a best response
move, her new utility is at least the same amount. Therefore, for every (γ + 1)
units of social welfare lost due to coordination, at least one unit of social welfare
is gained, giving us the desired bound. 
We are now in a position to show our main result. Since the above algorithm
returns a solution whose social welfare is close to that of the starting state, it
seems to natural to select a starting state with a high social welfare. We choose
the strategy k∗ that players have the maximum intrinsic preference for, i.e.,
k∗ = arg max1≤k≤m(
∑
i w
k
i ).
Theorem 4.5. The following algorithm returns an α-Approximate Equilib-
rium for α ∈ [φ, 2] whose social welfare is approximately at least a fraction
≈ max( α
γ + 3
,
1
m
) of the optimum social welfare.
Algorithm: “For a given α, run One-shot α-BR and One-shot 1α−1 -
BR with k∗ as the starting strategy. Let the returned solutions be
s1 and s2. Return the solution among these two with greater social
welfare.”
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Discussion. The exact social welfare is:
α− 1
1 + (γ+1)α (α− (1 + 1m ))
times OPT
when (γ + 1) ≤ αm, and max( αγ+1 , α−1(m−1)+(α−1) ) times OPT otherwise. We
attempt to break-down the dependence of social welfare on different parameters.
First, notice from the approximate formula αγ+1 that the social welfare increases
almost linearly with α. In other words, as is usually the case, sacrificing a little
individual stability results in greater overall well being. At the same time, we
see that social welfare decreases when γ becomes larger, i.e., when relationships
become more asymmetric. Therefore, for a designer, there are two possible
measures to ensure socially efficient outcomes: (i) imposing a higher switching
cost on agents, (ii) splitting the rewards of coordination almost equally.
Our algorithm provides good guarantees when γ is not too large. For in-
stance, when the benefits from coordination are off by at most a factor of 2
(γ ≤ 2), our algorithm returns a 1.618-Approximate Equilibrium that is almost
one third of OPT even if the number of available alternatives is arbitrarily large.
Contrast this with the result in Proposition 3.3 that states as m →∞, the so-
cial welfare of equilibria becomes infinitely worse off than the optimum. For the
same γ, if we sacrifice some stability and move to a 2-Approximate Equilibrium,
we get more than forty percent of the optimum in terms of welfare. Finally, the
social welfare is bounded by ≈ 1m , which indicates that even when γ is large,
our solutions are at least as good as that of the Nash Equilibrium (when they
exist). In other words, running our algorithm is always preferable to letting
agents form their own strategies. Figure 2(b) illustrates how the social welfare
drops when relationships become more asymmetric.
(Proof Sketch) Both the procedures in the algorithm result in an α-Approximate
Equilibrium. Applying Lemma 4.2 to the solution returned by the 1-shot 1α−1 -
BR procedure, we get that its stability factor is max( 1α−1 ,
1
1
α−1
+ 1), that is
max( 1α−1 , α). s1 is, therefore, an α-approximate Nash equilibrium as α ≥ 1α−1
for α ∈ [φ, 2]. Similarly, applying the lemma to s2, we get that its stability
factor is max(α, 1α + 1), which is also α for the given range. This establishes the
stability factor.
The social welfare of the state where all players have chosen strategy k∗ is
at least ATm + PT as players have greater overall intrinsic preference for this
strategy than any other strategy. Applying Lemma 4.4 to our algorithm’s α-BR
procedure, we get that the final social welfare of the solution, u(s), is at least
AT
m +
α
γ+1PT . Applying Lemma 4.3 to our One-shot
1
α−1 -BR algorithm, we get
that our computed solution has a social welfare of at least (α − 1)AT . Taking
the best solution among the two and finding the point where it is minimum
gives us the desired bound. .
We return to the case where γ = 1. We previously proved that the best Nash
Equilibrium has a social welfare which is a factor 2 − 1m less than OPT. Sub-
stituting, γ = 1 in the above equation, we see our 2-Approximate Equilibrium
has the same social welfare as the best Nash Equilibrium.
Corollary 4.6. For the special case when coordination benefits are split equally
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Figure 2: Social Welfare as a function of α and γ.
(γ = 1), our algorithm returns a 2-Approximate Equilibrium that is more half
as good as the optimum and a 1.618-Approximate Equilibrium that is at least a
fraction 0.35 of OPT.
4.1 Strong Equilibrium
In any game involving coordination, it becomes important to consider Strong
Nash stability as coalitions of players may be able to cooperate when switching
to different strategies. Given our focus on computing good, approximately stable
solutions, it becomes imperative to design solutions where for any group of
players who can deviate and improve their utility, at least one player’s utility
increases by a factor non more tha α. We term this α-approximate Strong
equilibrium. In this section, we show both (non-)existence and computability
results for Strong and approximately Strong equilibria.
We begin by looking at Social Coordination games with only two strategies.
Our first result is that any SCG with two strategies admits a Strong Nash
Equilibrium. We give a constructive proof for this by extending Algorithm 1
from Section 2 to also compute SNE.
Proposition 4.7. Any instance with m = 2 strategies admits a Strong Nash
equilibrium. The following algorithm computes a Strong Nash Equilibrium.
1. Let s0 be the starting state with all players present in 1.
2. While there exist any group of players who can deviate from
strategy 1 to strategy 2 such that each player’s utility increases
strictly from their previous utility, allow this group to deviate.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Algorithm 1. Observe that by definition,
no set of players can deviate from 1 and improve their utility. If a set of players
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from 2 deviate to 1, then it is not hard to see that the player in this set who
deviated at the earliest time step in the algorithm cannot be improving her
utility.
For three or more strategies, strong equilibrium may not exist even for the
simplest special case of Symmetric SCGs where γ = 1 and Nash Equilibrium
is guaranteed to exist. The non-existence of strong equilibrium motivates us to
look at approximate Strong equilibria and how to compute them efficiently. Our
main result in this section is the efficient computation of a 2-approximate Strong
equilibrium with good social welfare. First, we exhibit a non-trivial example to
prove the non-existence of Strong Nash Equilibrium.
Proposition 4.8. There are instances of the symmetric Social Coordination
Game with m = 3 groups where Strong equilibrium does not exist. However,
whenever Strong equilibrium exists, its social welfare is no less than half of
OPT when player relationships are symmetric.
Proof. Consider the instance shown in Figure 3 with 3 strategies and 5 players.
The figure makes use of the graph theoretic framework defined in 2. As the
instance is symmetric, we assume that utility recieved due to coordination by
both the players equals the weight on the edge (w(i,j)2 ). In any Nash equilibrium
for this instance, two players from two different strategies can always deviate to
the third strategy and improve their utilities. For instance, consider the state
shown in the figure, i2 and i5 can deviate to strategy 2 and both increase their
utilities. In any state where i2 is not present in strategy 1, i1 and i3 can jointly
deviate to 3. In all other states, at least one player can perform best-response
by herself. We prove the second part of the claim in the appendix.
Proposition 4.9. For α ≥ 1, the One-shot α-BR returns a (1+α)-Approximate
Strong Equilibrium.
We remark here that for α = 1, we get a 2-Approximate Strong Equilibrium
whose social welfare is at least half of that mentioned in Theorem 4.5. Therefore,
our One-shot α-BR algorithm also offers resilience against group deviations. The
full proof of the above proposition is present in the Appendix.
(Proof Sketch) Let s be the solution returned. For any player i whose strat-
egy is k0, for any other strategy k, we have αui(s) ≥ ui(k, s−i). Therefore,
after any group deviation to strategy k (if the final strategy is s′), we have
ui(s
′) ≤ ui(k, s−i) + ui(s) ≤ (α+ 1)ui(s), which gives us the bound. For play-
ers whose strategy is other than k0, their utility cannot increase a factor more
than 1 + 1α ≤ (1 + α). 
5 Incentivizing Players
So far, we have looked at approximate equilibria for our game, which become
fully stable when there are some incentives provided to players or when there is
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Figure 3: Example: Symmetric Social Coordination Game with three strategies
marked by ellipses (anchored players are shaded) and five players. For the
purpose of clarity, edges between players are solid, whereas the edges between
players and anchors are dashed. In the current state, all players within an ellipse
have their strategies set to be that corresponding strategy.
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limited inertia in switching. We now consider a more explicit incentivizing tech-
nique where a central authority can provide arbitrary payments to any subset
of players in order to enforce a desired solution. Ideally, this desired solution
is the social optimum although we later consider other high welfare solutions
which are easily computable. In such situations, there are often budgets con-
straints which determine the total such payments that can be made and we
wish to obtain bounds on the minimum budget required for any given instance.
Our main result here is the complement of Theorem 4.5. Informally our result
implies that when the solution returned by the Algorithm in Theorem 4.5 does
not have a high social welfare, then we can ‘stabilize’ a solution that is close
to OPT with a very small budget. Together, the results indicate that for any
instance, we can either compute a good solution of provide small payments to
enforce a solution close to OPT.
We now define our incentive scheme: we are interested in ‘stabilizing’ a given
solution s by providing each player i a payment of νiOPT , where 0 ≤ νi ≤ 1,
such that her total utility is now ui(s) + νi · OPT . More precisely, players
are provided this additional utility if and only if they stick to their prescribed
strategy under s. A solution is said to be successfully stabilized if after the
additional payments, no player wishes to deviate from strategy si. Our goal is to
bound ν, the total payment that is required as a fraction of the optimum welfare,
i.e., ν · OPT = ∑i νi · OPT . Now suppose for that for a given instance of the
coordination game, the α-Approximate Equilibrium returned by our Algorithm
of Theorem 4.5 has a social welfare of ρα·OPT for ρα ≤ 1. Note that ρα is
actually a function of the given instance which we omit as its meaning here is
clear. Our second main result is the following.
Theorem 5.1. For any given instance, the optimum solution can be stabilized
by providing direct payments to players such that the total payment is at most
a fraction ν ≤ ρα(α−1) times the social welfare of OPT.
The above result indicates that if we run our algorithm from Theorem 4.5
and get a solution with low social welfare (ρα is small), then we can stabilize the
optimum solution with a total payment that is approximately equal to ρα·OPT.
We previously observed that when both γ and m are large, the solution returned
by our algorithm may not be too efficient. In such cases, we can do much better
by implementing the optimal solution and providing small incentives to players.
Proof. To be concrete, let us assume that we have run the Algorithm of The-
orem 4.5 and obtained a solution whose social welfare is a fraction ρα times
OPT for that given instance. Let s∗ be the social optimum and by definition,
u(s∗) = A(s∗) + P (s∗), i.e., the components of the total welfare derived from
players’ intrinsic preferences and that obtained from player relationships respec-
tively. Let X ⊆ N denote the players to whom payments have to be provided in
s∗ in order to prevent them from deviating and suppose that ∀i ∈ X, ki, denotes
their best-response strategy. Now how much additional utility νiOPT should
we provide player i? The minimum such incentive required must equal the
additional utility that she would gain by performing best-response from OPT,
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i.e., viOPT = ui(ki, s
∗
−i) − ui(s∗). The second term in the right hand side is
bounded by the utility that players derive from the anchors alone. Therefore,
we have, ∑
i∈X
(ui(ki, s
∗
−i)− ws
∗
i
i ) ≥
∑
i∈X
(ui(ki, s
∗
−i)− ui(s∗)).
It suffices therefore to say that the term in the LHS of the above inequality serves
as an upper bound for the total payments required to stabilize the optimum. Let
us overload notation and represent
∑
i∈X ui(ki, s
∗
−i) = A(X) + P (X), where as
usual the first term represents the utility coming from the intrinsic preferences
and the second term the coordination utility. Now, we have νOPT ≤ A(X) +
P (X)−∑i∈X ws∗ii .
Consider a strategy vector s′, where all players choose the same strategy,
say k0, for some 1 ≤ k0 ≤ m. We know, u(OPT ) ≥ u(s′). We therefore, have
A(s∗) + P (s∗) ≥ A(s′) + P (s′) ≥ P (s′) = PT ≥ P (s∗) + P (X). The final
inequality comes from the fact that P (X) and P (OPT ) are disjoint, i.e., the
coordination utility that players would derive by deviating from OPT is not
a part of OPT itself. But together P (X) + P (OPT ) ≤ PT , which represents
the total coordination utility derived when all players are choosing the same
strategy. Removing P (s∗) from both sides, we get, A(s∗) ≥ P (X). Finally we
have,
νOPT ≤ A(X) + P (X)−
∑
i∈X
w
s∗i
i (2)
≤ A(X) +A(s∗)−
∑
i∈X
w
s∗i
i (3)
=
∑
i∈X
wkii +
∑
i∈N
w
s∗i
i −
∑
i∈X
w
s∗i
i (4)
=
∑
i∈X
wkii +
∑
i/∈X
w
s∗i
i (5)
≤ AT . (6)
So we now have AT , the sum of the utilities that each selfish player derives from
choosing her favorite strategy as an upper bound for νOPT . We know from the
proof of Theorem 4.5, that our α-Approximate Equilibria have a utility of at
least AT (α− 1). So we conclude νOPT ≤ ραα−1 .
Putting this in perspective, if our 1.618-Approximate Equilibrium has a
Social Welfare that is one-tenth of OPT, then we can stabilize the optimum by
providing total payments no greater than sixteen percent of OPT. The bottom
line for a central enforcer is that a little incentivizing goes a long way in ensuring
socially efficient outcomes in coordination games. For every given instance,
we can either apply the algorithm of Theorem 4.5 to compute a good quality
approximate equilibrium or enforce even the optimum solution with a small total
budget, thereby always ensuring high welfare, stable outcomes. Unfortunately,
computing the optimum is NP-hard and therefore, we consider stabilizing other
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high quality solutions that are a good approximation to OPT . In particular, we
claim that the 0.8535 approximation to OPT provided by the polynomial-time
algorithm in [28] can be stabilized with the same total payments as required for
the optimum.
Corollary 5.2. There exists a solution computable in polynomial time whose
social welfare is at least 0.8535 times OPT, which can be stabilized by providing
total payments ν no greater than ραα−1 times OPT.
(Proof Sketch) We first take the 0.8535 approximation to the optimum re-
turned by the Algorithm in [28]. Then we consider a solution where all players
are present in k∗, where k∗ is the strategy that maximizes the total intrinsic
utility derived by players as we defined previously. Now, let s be the solution
among these two that has higher social welfare. We claim that s can be stabi-
lized with a total payment of ραα−1 times OPT. We do not go over the proof as
it is exactly similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1. 
5.1 Influencing Strong Equilibrium by strengthening re-
lationships
Previously, we showed that although strong equilibrium may not exist in general,
a 2-Approximate strong equilibrium always exists and can be computed. In this
section, we look at α-Approximate Strong Equilibrium for 1 ≤ α ≤ 2 and show
that these always exist in the presence of a little additional influence. Our
influencing technique is quite different from our previous strategy of providing
players direct incentives. Specifically, player i receives full utility from all the
other players choosing the same strategy such that w(i, j) > 0 and a small
fraction ω of the utility from players with whom they originally had w(i, j) = 0.
From the perspective of viewing our game as a network game, we are essentially
creating links between players. We only consider SCGs that obey the correlated
coordination condition to eliminate uncertainty over the reward sharing.
Model: We first consider an equivalent formulation of the SCGs that obey
the CC condition. Namely, let us associate two parameters with each player ai
and bi such that when players i and j coordinate, player i receives a utility of
aibjw(i, j) and player j receives ajbiw(i, j). It is not hard to see that this is
at least as general as the CC condition3. We add an additional constraint over
the weights, namely w(i, j) = 0 or w(i, j) = 1 or w(i, j) = −∞. The minus
infinity weights can be viewed as conflict edges. In other words, players i and j
can never choose the same strategy. Such a model with conflict edges was first
considered in [26] to study the formation of gossip networks. Given such an
SCG, we now define the ω extension of the game for ω ∈ [ 12 , 1] to be the social
coordination game with the same parameters except w(i, j) = ω where it was
previously zero.
The incentivizing technique that we use here is quite intuitive. We let players
derive full benefit from their neighbors present in the same group, but also give
3given γ = (γ1, · · · , γN ) and w(i, j) for all (i, j), we simply replace w(i, j) with (γi +
γj)w(i, j), set ai = γi ∀i and bi = 1 ∀i.
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them to a fraction ω utility from edges where w(i, j) = 0 originally. Formally,
given a SCG, let N(i) be all the j such that w(i, j) = 1 and F (i) be all the j
such that w(i, j) = 0. After incentivizing, in any given strategy s, a player’s
utility is
ui(s) =
∑
sj=si
j∈N(i)
aibj + ω
∑
sj=si
j∈F (i)
aibj
Our following result can be viewed as an extension of a result in [26], showing
the existence of Approximate Strong Equilibria.
Proposition 5.3. The ω-extension of any given SCG obeying the correlated
coordination condition with weights as defined above admits a 1ω -Approximate
Strong Equilibrium.
We use the technique of lexicographic ordering that has been used for show-
ing the existence of strong equilibrium in various guises in literature [23]. The
appropriate definition for lexicographic ordering is present in the appendix.
Proof. Consider a m-dimensional vector pi : A 7→ Rm+ defined on each state s
such that the kth component of the vector pik(s) is equal to
∑
i:si=k
bi. Recall
that the set of allowed states A only includes strategy vectors where no two
conflicted users are present in the same group.
Now consider the solution s∗ such that all the other solutions are sorted
lexicographically smaller than s∗, i.e. pi(s)  pi(s∗) for all s. We claim that
s∗ is a 1ω -approximate strong equilibrium. Consider any deviation by a group
of players from s∗ to a new solution s and let i be the player whose original
strategy had the largest weight(smallest index) under the lexicographic ordering.
Suppose i deviates from strategy k to k′, we claim that pik(s∗) ≥ pik′(s). If this
were not true, then the strategy vector s would be lexicographically larger than
s∗. Now the utility that i received originally is
ui(s
∗) = ai(
∑
s∗j=s
∗
i
j∈N(i)
bj + ω
∑
s∗j=s
∗
i
j∈F (i)
bj) ≥ ωai
∑
j 6=i
s∗j=k
bj = aiω(pik(s
∗)− bi).
i’s utility after deviating is ui(s) ≤ ai
∑
sj=k′ bj = ai(pik′(s)− bi) ≤ ai(pik(s∗)−
bi) ≤ 1ωui(s∗). This completes the proof of the theorem.
Corollary 5.4. When ω = 1, every instance of the ω-extension of SCGs obeying
with the correlated coordination condition admits a Strong Equilibrium.
6 Social Coordination with Complementarities
In this section, we generalize our model of social coordination to include sce-
narios where the benefits due to coordination may exhibit complementarities
or supermodularities. So far, we have looked at incentivizing players and com-
puting approximate equilibrium for a very specific model of social coordination
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where the benefits are additively separable. However, it is not hard to see that
most of our results extend to the case when utilities and welfare may be sub-
modular in the set of players. We now generalize this further and consider SCGs
wherein the benefits gained by coordinating with a set of players can be much
larger than the utility gained by individually coordinating with each of them.
Model for Generalized Social Coordination Game. We consider a
game with players belonging to a set N , a strategy set M and functions w :
2N∪M 7→ R+ and ui : 2N∪M 7→ R+ for all players i ∈ N . Players still choose a
single strategy and in any given state of the game s, welfare due to all players
Xk choosing strategy k is given by w(k +Xk). This welfare is then distributed
among the players, so we have∑
i∈Xk
ui(s) =
∑
i∈Xk
ui(k +Xk) = w(k +Xk).
The total social welfare of the solution is given by u(s) =
∑
i ui(s) =
∑
k∈M w(k+
Xk). Observe that we have made no assumptions on the functions w and ui.
Therefore, we may have that w(S ∪ T ) ≥ w(S) +w(T ), which is not possible in
our previous model. We only require that the total welfare generated is divided
among the players.
There has always been considerable interest in utility-maximization games
where either the resources or players exhibit complementarities. Situations of
interest include combinatorial auctions wherein valuation functions can be su-
permodular in the set of items received, or group formation where people may
possess specific sets of skills. However, there has not been much progress in this
realm of algorithmic game theory as even the fundamental algorithmic problem
of maximizing welfare in the presence of complements is considered notoriously
difficult. Recent papers [1, 17, 29] have sought to overcome this obstacle by
limiting the amount of supermodularity (or complementarity) present in the
valuations in combinatorial auctions. With regard to full-information games
such as ours, most similar to our model is the welfare-sharing game proposed
by Bachrach et al. [6] who showed bounds on the Strong Price of Anarchy. In-
stead, here we focus on questions related to existence and computation of stable
solutions.
We begin by showing that there exist instances of the Generalized SCG (with
complementarities) that exhibit no stable solutions when the criterion consid-
ered is (Approximate) Nash Stability. Previously, we proved that all instances of
SCGs without complementarity admit a 1.618-Approximate Equilibrium. How-
ever, when the player relationships become complementary, there exist instances
which do not admit an α-Approximate Equilibrium for any α ≥ 1.
Proposition 6.1. For any c ≥ 1, there exists an instance of the Generalized
Social Coordination Game which does not admit an α-Approximate Equilibrium
for all 1 ≤ α ≤ c.
Proof. The example that we use here is an extension of the triangle example from
Proposition 3.1. Once again consider three players i, j, k and three strategies
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1, 2, 3. We define the utility function for player i for different scenarios. The
functions for players j and k are defined similarly. ui(1) = ui(1+k) = c
2, ui(1+
j) = ui(1+j+k) = c
3, ui(2) = c, ui(2+j) = ui(2+j+k) = c
3, ui(3) = ui(3+k) =
0, ui(3 + j + k) = c. Once again, it is not hard to verify that in any state at
least one player can deviate and improve her utility by a factor c. Therefore,
this instance admits no α-Approximate Equilibrium for any α ≤ c.
The non-existence of Approximate Nash Equilibrium for Generalized SCGs
forces us to consider a more restricted model. We consider two forms of limited
complementarities that have also been considered in other settings in literature.
First, we look at hypergraph SCGs, a direct extension of the Network Game
model mentioned in Section 2. We show some sufficient conditions for the
existence of a Nash Equilibrium. We then move on to a model where the degree
of supermodularity is bounded by some constant r. We adapt our One-Shot
α-BR algorithm to obtain a Θ(r)-Approximate equilibrium.
6.1 Hypergraph Social Coordination Games
Once again, we view our SCG as a network game where the nodes include the
players and the anchored nodes (strategies). There exist a set of hyperedges E,
and each hyperedge has a weight we. The total welfare of a set S is given by
w(S) =
∑
e∈S we, where the summation is over the hyperedges whose member
vertices all belong to S. The welfare due a hyperedge is distributed among the
vertices that comprise the hyperedge. For each player i ∈ e, we have a constant
γei such that i’s utility due to the hyperedge is given by γ
e
iwe. As is natural, the
constants γei satisfy
∑
i∈e γ
e
i = 1. Such a model with a hypergraph induced on
a set of items (instead of the players) was considered in [1] and they provided a
r-Approximation Algorithm for welfare maximization where r is the maximum
number of vertices present in a single hyperedge. We now extend our previous
Correlated Coordination Condition for this Generalized SCG and show that
Nash Equilibrium always exists for instances that obey the CC condition.
(Correlated Coordination Condition) A given instance of the SCG on
hypergraphs is said to satisfy this condition if ∃ a vector γ = (γ1, · · · , γN ) such
that ∀e ∈ E with we > 0, we have γei = γi∑
j∈e γj
for all the vertices that belong
to the hyperedge.
Proposition 6.2. Hypergraph Social Coordination Games which obey the Cor-
related Coordination (CC) Condition admit a potential function. Therefore,
best-response dynamics always converge to a Nash Equilibrium in such games.
Proof. Given a social coordination game with weights we,∀e ∈ E and γ =
(γ1, · · · , γN ), that obeys the CC condition, we claim that the following is an
inexact potential function for this game.
Φ(s) =
∑
e:
si=sj∀i∈e,j∈e
we∑
j∈e γj
.
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Note that γi = 0 for all the anchored nodes as they do not receive any utility.
The proof follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.2
6.2 Social Coordination Games with bounded supermod-
ularity
We consider general SCGs where the welfare and utility may exhibit comple-
mentarities but we bound the amount of complementarity in each player’s utility
by a multiplicative factor r ≥ 1. Specifically, we define a r-Supermodular SCG
as a game where for all players i, we have ui(S ∪ T ) ≤ r(ui(S) + ui(T )) for any
S and T . Informally this implies that even though the welfare due to a group of
people coordinating is more than the sum of welfare due to smaller subgroups
coordinating, the additional welfare due to complementarity is bounded by some
parameter. The Social Coordination Games considered in Sections 1-5 satisfy
this criterion with r = 1 and therefore, r-Supermodular SCGs are natural gen-
eralizations of linear or submodular Social Coordination Games.
Similar notions of restricted complementarities were studied in [29] and [17].
Both papers considered the optimization problem of welfare maximization and
obtained approximation factors linear in the degree of supermodularity. We now
consider the problem of computing an approximate equilibrium for SCGs with
bounded supermodularity and show that every r-Supermodular SCG admits an
approximate equilibrium whose stability factor is linear in the parameter r. It
is an interesting open question whether this bound is tight or whether we can
obtain stability factors sublinear in r.
Once again we turn to our One-Shot α-BR algorithm and adjust its param-
eter to obtain an r + -Approximate Equilibrium for some  < 1.
Theorem 6.3. For any given instance of a r-Supermodular SCG, ∃ an  < 1,
such that running the One-Shot α-BR algorithm for α = r +  returns a r + -
Approximate Nash Equilibrium.
In other words, we can always compute a Θ(r)-Approximate Nash Equilib-
rium for any r-Supermodular SCG.
Proof. Let k0 be the starting strategy for all players. Once again we assume
that players deviate from k0 in rounds, let Xk(t) refer to the set of players whose
strategy is k after t rounds. Suppose we allow players to deviate only when it
improves their utility by a factor α or more (we will see what this factor is
shortly). Let s be the final solution. For every player i in s whose strategy is
k0, she cannot improve her utility by a factor more than α if she deviates (by
definition). For any player who deviated to a strategy k 6= k0 at some time t, if
her best-response is k′, we then have
ui(k
′, s−i) = ui(X ′k) ≤ ui(X ′k(t) ∪Xk0(t)) ≤ r(ui(X ′k(t) + ui(Xk0(t))).
But since k was i’s best-response at time t, we have ui(s) ≥ ui(X ′k(t) and
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ui(s) ≥ αui(Xk0(t)). So we can finally conclude that
ui(k
′, s−i) ≤ r(ui(X ′k(t) + ui(Xk0(t))) ≤ rui(s)(1 +
1
α
).
The stability factors for the two sets of players are α and r(1 + 1α ) respectively.
In the best possible case, they are both equal, giving us α = 12 (r+
√
r(r + 4)) <
r + 1 for r ≥ 1.
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Appendix
A Proofs from Section 3
Proposition 3.3. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) for the Social Coordination
Game over all instances is at most m.
Proof. Definition A payoff-maximization game is (λ, µ)-semi-smooth if there
exists a mixed strategy σi for each player i such that for every outcome s
Eσ
[∑
i∈N
ui(σi, s−i)
]
≥ λ · u(s∗)− µ · u(s).
It is easy to show that a game being semi-smooth implies all the same results
from [33] as smoothness, including a bound of 1+µλ for the price of total anarchy.
We now show that our Social Coordination Game is ( 1m , 0)-semi-smooth for all
instances. This immediately gives us an upper bound of m for the Price of
Anarchy not just for Nash Equilibrium but for other more general solution
concepts as well.
For any given strategy vector s, for each player i, let σi be the mixed strategy
where the player chooses each available strategy with equal probability 1m . Then
we have,
E
[∑
i∈N
ui(σi, s−i)
]
=
∑
1≤k≤m
1
m
(wki +
∑
sj=k
γijw(i, j)) =
1
m
(
∑
1≤k
wki +
∑
j∈N
γijw(i, j)).
The final inside the parenthesis on the right hand side represents the maximum
utility that player i could receive in any given solution and thereby acts as
an upper bound for her utility in the optimum solution. Summing the above
equation for all players, we have,
∑
i∈N E [ui(σi, s−i)] ≥ 1m ·u(s∗). We therefore
conclude that our Social Coordination Game is ( 1m , 0)-semi-smooth.
Proposition 3.5. The price of stability is at most (2− 1m ) in social coordination
games with symmetric relationships, i.e. γ = 1. Further, this bound is tight.
Proof. Definition A strategy vector s0 is said to satisfy the Minimum In-
trinsic Preference condition(MIP) if the sum of utilities derived by players
purely from their intrinsic preference for their respective strategy (w
s0i
i ) is at
least 1m times the utility players derive from the strategies in any other solu-
tion.
For a strategy vector s0 that satisfies the MIP condition, we are guaranteed
that A(s0) ≥ 1mA(s) for any given strategy vector s.
Proposition .4. Let s0 be a solution that satisfies the Minimum Intrinsic Pref-
erence condition. Then, any best-response dynamics starting from s0 results in
a Nash equilibrium s such that the social welfare of s0 is at most (2− 1m ) times
that of s.
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What this implies is that best-response dynamics from certain “good” start-
ing points is guaranteed to terminate in Nash equilibria without much loss in
social welfare. If the social optimum satisfies the MIP condition, then Propo-
sition .4 tells us that there exists a Nash equilibrium whose social welfare is at
least 1
(2− 1m )
times that of the optimum. We first prove the proposition and then
show that the social optimum does indeed satisfy the MIP condition, which
immediately proves Proposition 3.5.
(Proof of Proposition .4)
Let s be the Nash equilibrium in which the best-response dynamics from a
solution s0 that obeys the MIP condition terminates. Since the value of the
potential function cannot decrease after any best-response sequence, we have
Φ(s) > Φ(s0). This implies,
u(s) = 2Φ(s)−A(s) > 2Φ(s0)−A(s) = u(s0) +A(s0)−A(s).
Since s0 satisfies the MIP condition, we know that A(s0) ≥ 1mA(s). This gives
us
u(s) > u(s0)− (1− 1
m
)A(s) (7)
=⇒ (2− 1m )u(s) > u(s0), (8)
where the last step comes from the fact that A(s) ≤ u(s). This completes the
proof of the claim.
It is easy to see that OPT does satisfy the MIP condition. First, we construct
a solution s2 where all the players choose the same strategy, the one maximizing
total utility. Since, there exist only m strategies, we know that the utility players
derive from that strategy is at least 1m times that of the sum of utilities all players
derive from all strategies, which is in turn greater than AT , i.e., we have u(s2) ≥
1
mAT +PT . Since u(OPT ) ≥ u(s2), we have A(OPT )+P (OPT ) ≥ 1mAT +PT .
Note that P (OPT ) can never be greater than PT since PT includes all the edges
between players in a given graph. This means that A(OPT ) has to be at least
1
mAT for the inequality to hold. Now for any given solution s
′, A(s′) ≤ AT ,
which finally gives us the desired result.
A(OPT ) ≥ 1
m
AT ≥ 1
m
A(s′),
for all s′.
We note here that this gap between the social optimum and the stable solu-
tion maximizing welfare occurs due to the fact that edges between players count
only once in the potential function but twice towards the social welfare. The
worst case does indeed occur when players choose to follow their most preferred
strategy selfishly as opposed to being with their neighbors. We now give a fam-
ily of examples that illustrate this inherent inefficiency that comes with stability
and in the process show that the bound of 2− 1m is tight in the limiting case.
Example Consider an instance with m strategies and m players where each
player has a different preferred strategy from which she derives a utility of
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wii = r + . There is one player p such that w(i, p) = r for all other players i.
The only Nash equilibrium has a perfectly fragmented society where each player
chooses her preferred strategy, achieving a total welfare of mr + m, whereas
all players choose the same strategy in the social optimum which has a welfare
of (2m− 1)r + . In the limiting case, as → 0, the ratio between the welfares
approaches 2− 1m .
B Proofs from Section 4
Proposition 4.1. The following algorithm returns a
√
2-Approximate Equilib-
rium for all instances with three strategies and no algorithm can give a better
approximation factor over all instances as this ratio of 1.414 is tight.
1. Run Algorithm 1 for m = 2 (for say strategies 1 and 2) and all players
so that no player wants to deviate from one of those two strategies to the
other.
2. While there exists a player, who can deviate from either strategy 1 or
strategy 2 and improve her utility by a factor
√
2, allow her to deviate to
strategy 3. Once that player deviates, run the algorithm for m = 2 (for
strategies 1 and 2) so that players choosing these two strategies are stable
with respect to each other.
3. Repeat step 2 until no player can to deviate to 3 and increase her utility
by a factor
√
2.
Proof. Let the final solution be s. We consider players choosing strategy 3 in
rounds. Suppose i is the player choosing 3 at some time (round) t, then let
st−i be the strategy vector at time t indicating the strategies of all players other
than i. Let Xk(s) be the set of players whose strategy is k under s. We have
by definition,
ui(3, s
t
−i) ≥
√
2ui(2, s
t
−i)
ui(3, s
t
−i) ≥
√
2ui(1, s
t
−i)
In other words, player i receives more utility by a factor
√
2 from strategy 3 than
she does from either 1 or 2 at that time. Now observe that in the final solution,
X1(s) ∪ X2(s) cannot be more than the set of players present in strategies 1
and 2 at any time t before termination. Therefore, for player i, both ui(1, s−i)
and ui(2, (s−i)) are bounded from above by ui(1, st−i)+ui(2, s
t
−i). So we finally
have the maximum utility i can get by switching from strategy 3 to either 1 or
2 in s,
ui(1, s
t
−i) + ui(2, s
t
−i) ≤
2ui(3, s
t
−i)√
2
) ≤
√
2ui(s)).
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The last inequality comes from the fact that since the set of players in
strategy 3 only increases in size, i’s final utility is at least as much as the utility
she received when she deviated to 3. By definition, the algorithm terminates
when players in strategies 1 and 2 cannot improve their utility by more than a
factor
√
2 by deviating to 3, so the stability factor is trivially applicable for such
players. Finally, players in strategy 1 do not wish to deviate to 2 and vice-versa
by definition. This completes our proof.
Lemma 4.3. The 1-shot α-BR algorithm, beginning with any starting strategy
k0, returns a solution whose social welfare is at least
AT
α
Proof. We use the same notation as before. Note that any player who performs
her best-response gets utility at least best(i) = maxk w
k
i , since she could always
deviate to (or stay in) her preferred strategy. Her final utility is also at least
best(i) as player utilities do not decrease when more people choose the same
strategy. Any player whose final strategy is k0 cannot deviate and improve
her utility by a factor more than α, by definition. Therefore, her utility has
to be at least best(i)α . Suppose the final strategy vector is s, we then have
u(s) =
∑
i ui(s) ≥
∑
i
best(i)
α ≥ ATα .
Lemma 4.4. The one-shot α-BR algorithm with s0 as the starting state (where
all players choose a strategy k0), results in a social welfare of at least A(s0) +
α
γ+1P (s0), where γ is the Maximum Relationship imbalance.
Proof. Consider a deviation from some intermediate state s′ by player i, which
improves her utility by a factor α. Then, the original social welfare decreases by
(not counting the new utility yet) at most w
s′i
i +
∑
s′j=s
′
i
(γij + γji)w(i, j). But
since, by definition of γ, we have γji ≤ γ.γij , we can now bound the decrease in
utility by w
s′i
i +
∑
s′j=s
′
i
(γij +γ.γij)w(i, j) = w
s′i
i +(γ+1)
∑
s′j=s
′
i
γijw(i, j). The
increase in social welfare is at least the new utility of player i which is a factor α
times her old utility. Therefore this increase is at least, α(w
s′i
i +
∑
s′j=s
′
i
γijw(i, j)).
Therefore, in any deviation, for every unit of utility lost from a player’s
intrinsic preference, α units of utility are gained and for (γ + 1) units of utility
from player coordination lost, α units are gained. Also observe that once a
player deviates to a strategy, she cannot change after that, so players’ utilities
never decrease. It is not hard to verify that the maximum social welfare is lost
when all the welfare lost comes from the player coordinations before a player
switched from k0. Since the maximum utility due to coordinations in s0 is
P (s0), the resulting utility gain from the deviations is at least
αP (s0)
γ+1 . In the
worse case, the utility due to intrinsic preference that players in s0 is retained
in s, giving us the desired social welfare of A(s0) +
α
γ+1P (s0).
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Theorem 4.5. The following algorithm returns an α-Approximate Equilibrium
for α ∈ [φ, 2] whose social welfare is at least a fraction α− 1
1 + (γ+1)α (α− (1 + 1m ))
of the optimum when (γ + 1) ≤ mα, and max( αγ+1 , α−1(m−1)+(α−1) ) times OPT
otherwise.
Algorithm: “For a given α, run One-shot α-BR and One-shot 1α−1 -
BR with k∗ as the starting strategy. Let the returned solutions be
s1 and s2. Return the solution among these two with greater social
welfare.”
Proof. We begin by establishing that both the procedures in the algorithm re-
sult in a α-Approximate Equilibrium. Applying Lemma 4.2 to the solution
returned by the 1-shot 1α−1 -BR procedure, we get that its stability factor is
max( 1α−1 ,
1
1
α−1
+ 1), that is max( 1α−1 , α). s1 is, therefore, an α-approximate
Nash equilibrium as α ≥ 1α−1 for α ∈ [φ, 2]. Similarly, applying the lemma to
s2, we get that its stability factor is max(α,
1
α +1), which is also α for the given
range. Since both s1 and s2 are α-Approximate Equilibrium, one can make the
same conclusion for s, since it is the best of the two solutions.
First, we claim that the total social welfare of the solution where all players
choose the strategy k∗ is at least ATm + PT . Recall that AT is the utility when
each player chooses her favorite strategy. Since the total intrinsic utility derived
when players choose k∗ is at least as much as the intrinsic utility from any
other strategy and since there are only a total of m strategies, we conclude
that A(s0) =
AT
m , where s0 is the strategy under which all players choose k
∗.
P (s0) = PT since all players are present in the same strategy. Now, applying
Lemma 4.3 to our algorithm’s α-BR procedure (where the starting state is
k∗), we get that the final social welfare of the solution, u(s), is at least ATm +
α
γ+1PT . Applying Lemma 4.3 to our One-shot
1
α−1 -BR algorithm, we get that
our computed solution has a social welfare of at least (α − 1)AT . Since our
hybrid algorithm returns the best of these two solutions, we have
u(s) ≥ max((α− 1)AT , AT
m
+
α
γ + 1
PT ).
Let us define AT = y(AT + PT ), for some y ≤ 1. Then, we get,
u(s) ≥ max
(
(α− 1)y, α
γ + 1
+ y(
1
m
− α
γ + 1
)
)
OPT (9)
First, let’s assume that αγ+1 ≥ 1m . Then, observe that the first term in the
parenthesis is increasing in y and the second term is decreasing. So, the max-
imum of the two terms is minimized when they are equal, i.e., (α − 1)y =
α
γ+1 + y(
1
m − αγ+1 ) or y = 11+ (γ+1)α (α−(1+ 1m )) . So we have u(s) is always greater
than y(α− 1)OPT = OPT
1+
(γ+1)
α (α−(1+ 1m ))
.
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Now, for the case when αγ+1 <
1
m , our results show that u(s) ≥ max( αγ+1 , α−1(m−1)+(α−1) ).
The first term simply follows from equation 9 from which we note that when
α
γ+1 <
1
m , u(s) ≥ αγ+1 . In order to show the second term, we prove a gen-
eral result that is applicable for all instances, namely that the social welfare is
bounded from below by ≈ 1m .
Lemma .5. The one-shot 1α−1 -BR algorithm beginning from any starting state
results in a social welfare which is at least a fraction α−1(m−1)+(α−1) times OPT.
Proof. Consider the outcome of One-Shot 1α−1 -BR algorithm. Any player who
deviated from their initial strategy received at least a fraction 1m times their
utility in OPT as they performed best-response and their utility cannot decrease
after that round. Players still present in the initial state k0 in s receive at least
α−1
(m−1)+(α−1) times their utility in OPT . To show this, observe that for any
such i, ui(s) ≥ (α − 1)ui(s′i, s−i) for s′i 6= si and ui(s) = ui(si, s−i). Summing
up these inequalities and the last equality, we have ((m− 1) + (α− 1))ui(s) ≥
(α − 1)ui(OPT ), which gives our desired fraction. Now since every player is
receiving at least the fraction α−1(m−1)+(α−1) of her utility in OPT , we have that
the social of our solution is also the same fraction of the optimum solution
welfare. This gives a lower bound on the social welfare of the solution returned
by our algorithm for all cases and completes the proof of the theorem and sub-
lemma.
Proposition 4.8. There are instances of the symmetric Social Coordination
Game with m = 3 groups where Strong equilibrium does not exist. However,
whenever Strong equilibrium exists, its social welfare is no less than half of OPT
when player relationships are symmetric.
Proof. The second part of the claim also applies for the symmetric SCG and
technique we use is quite common in the Strong Price of Anarchy literature. Let
s be any Strong Nash equilibrium(SNE) and s∗ denote the optimal solution.
Consider a group deviation from s by the set of players whose strategy is k in
OPT (Xk(s
∗)). Suppose these players deviate to strategy k from s forming a
new strategy vector s′. Since s is a SNE, in any group deviation there must be
at least one player whose utility cannot increase. Let this player be i. Then, i
must have received at least as much utility in s as she does after deviating to
k along with the players in Xk(s
∗). This means that ui(s) ≥ ui(s′) ≥ ui(s∗),
where the last inequality comes from the fact that in s′, Xk(s∗) ⊆ Xk(s′).
Now consider a deviation by all players in Xk(s
∗) to strategy k other than
player i. Once again, ∃ a player j such that j receives more utility from strategy
sj than from the set of players in Xk(s
∗)−{i}. So we get the inequality uj(s) ≥
uj(s
∗)− w(i,j)2 , since γij = γji = 1. If we again look at a deviation to strategy
k by all players other than i and j, there must be one player whose utility after
this deviation is not more than the utility before deviating in s, giving us a
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similar inequality as above. We therefore, repeat this process considering one
less player each time, and sum over all the inequalities obtained. It is not hard
to see that in the left hand side, we get
∑
i∈Xk(s∗) ui(s) and the right hand
side
∑
i;s∗i=k
wki + 0.5
∑
s∗i=s
∗
j=k
w(i, j), which is at least
∑
i∈Xk(s∗)
ui(s
∗)
2 . This
is because each edge among the players of Xk(s
∗) gets summed up only once
(when one of the players leave). We now repeat process for all strategies k and
set of players Xk(s), and sum over all the sets
Now summing these inequalities over all players and all strategies, we get∑
i
ui(s) ≥
∑
i
ui(s
∗)
2
,
which gives us our desired bound on the Strong Price of Anarchy.
Proposition 4.9. For α ≥ 1, the One-shot α-BR algorithm returns a (1 + α)-
Approximate Strong Equilibrium.
Proof. We already know by Lemma 4.2 that any deviation by a single player
cannot increase her utility by a factor greater than α. It is not immediately
clear why this factor holds for group deviations. As mentioned previously, let
V1 refer to the players who deviated from the initial state k
∗ and V2 be the
players whose strategies under s are k∗. We first claim that in any deviation by
a set of players S that includes at least one player from V1, the first player in
V1 ∩ S to have originally deviated from k∗ cannot improve her utility by more
than a factor (1 + 1α ).
Consider any group deviation by players S ⊆ V which contains at least
one player from V1. Let the new strategy vector be s2. Let i be the player
in S ∩ V1 who deviated from k∗ before all the other players in S, say at time
t. Since all the other players in S had k∗ as their strategy at time t, they
must have belonged to Xtk∗ . Suppose i’s strategy in s2 is k, then the utility
that i gets after deviating is at most ui(k, s
t
−i) + ui(k
∗, st−i). But this is not
greater than ui(si, s
t
−i) +
1
αui(si, s
t
−i), where the first term appears because si
is i’s best response and the second is because the new utility after deviating
is at least α times the old utility which was ui(k
∗, st−i). Therefore, we have
ui(s2) ≤ (1 + 1α )ui(s).
Now suppose S ⊆ V2, i.e. S ∩ V1 = ∅. We know
ui(s2) ≤ ui(k, s−i) + ui(k∗, s−i) (10)
for some i ∈ S, whose strategy under s2 is k. This is true because the all the
new players present in strategy k under s2 must have all been players whose
strategy in s was k∗. But ∀i ∈ V2, we know that the utility these players
originally received when their strategy was k∗ could not have improved by more
than a factor α after deviation, if they had deviated individually. Applying
this observation to equation 10, we have ui(s2) ≤ ui(k, s−i) + ui(k∗, s−i) ≤
αui(s) + ui(s). Therefore, in any group deviation from s, there is at least one
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player whose utility increases by a factor no more than (1 + α) for the solution
returned by the One-shot α-BR algorithm.
Specifically for α = 1, we get a 2-Approximate Strong Equilibrium for every
instance. Using the Sub-Lemmas of Theorem 4.5, we immediately get that this
solution gives us a guarantee of at least half the social welfare of Theorem 4.5.
C Proofs from Section 5
Lexicographic Ordering
We borrow the following definition from [23].
Definition Let pi(s1) and pi(s2) be the potential vector for two states s1, s2
and denote by p˜i(s1), p˜i(s2) be the sorted potential vectors respectively, derived
by sorting the entries of the actual vector in a non-increasing order, that is
p˜i1(s1) ≥ · · · ≥ p˜im(s1) and similarly for p˜i(s2). Then pi(s1) is strictly sorted
lexicographically smaller than pi(s2) (pi(s1) ≺ pi(s2)) if ∃ an index k such that
p˜il(s1) = p˜il(s2) ∀l < k and p˜ik(s1) < p˜ik(s2). Similarly, we say pi(s1) is sorted
lexicographically smaller than pi(s2) (pi(s1)  pi(s2)) when either pi(s1) ≺ pi(s2)
or pi(s1) = pi(s2).
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